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This paper compares epistemic virtue from the viewpoints of Zagzebski 
and Mulla Sadra, aiming to determine the extent to which their viewpoints 
on epistemic virtue are similar. Zagzebski, the contemporary philosopher, 
considers epistemic virtue as the basis on which knowledge is interpreted. 
She sees epistemic virtue as a requirement for achieving knowledge. 
Mulla Sadra, the founder of Transcendent Philosophy, considers 
knowledge as an outcome of intellectual virtues without which there 
would be no knowledge. The role these two philosophers ascribe to moral 
and intellectual virtues and vices in forming the identity makes it possible 
to compare their interpretation of epistemic virtues. As a virtue 
responsibilist, Zagzebski sees epistemic virtue as a character trait and 
explains its nature by its different components. Sadra as well, sees 
epistemic virtue as a character trait. Evidence shows that Sadra‘s 
definition of intellectual virtues is similar to that given by Zagzebski in 
many respects. Examining Zagzebski‘s viewpoint on epistemic virtue, this 
paper will discuss Sadra‘s viewpoint on epistemic virtue as well as its 
contribution to knowledge. In conclusion the similarities of the two 
viewpoints will be delineated. 
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Introduction 
Epistemic virtue is a fundamental concept underlying the justification 
of beliefs as well as the interpretations of knowledge given by virtue 
epistemologists. Virtue epistemology is defined as a set of recent 
approaches to epistemology, focusing on epistemic evaluation of 
agent rather than on that of his beliefs. Introduced in Ernest Sosa‘ 
paper ―the Raft and the Pyramid‖ (1980) and as a theory competing 
with analytic epistemology, virtue epistemology was intended to solve 
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the problems of epistemology. Aiming to solve Foundationalism and 
Coherenticism disputes as well as internalism and externalism, Sosa 
offered the idea of an upheaval in epistemology, shifting from the 
belief-centered epistemology to an agent-centered epistemology (Sosa 
1980). This constitutes the basics of virtue epistemology. Endorsed by 
philosophers such as Greco, Lorrain Code, James Montmarquet, 
Zagzebski, Fairweather, and Baehr, epistemic virtue was nevertheless 
interpreted in different ways. 
Although epistemologists unanimously endorsed the idea of 
epistemic virtues as a solution to problems emanating from classic and 
analytic epistemology, they have not given a unified and consented 
account of epistemic virtue. These divergent accounts led to two 
approaches, namely Reliabilism and Responsibilism. Virtue reliabilists 
define epistemic virtue as a reliable belief- producing faculty. In 
contrast, virtue responsibilitists define epistemic virtue as a character 
trait.  
As a virtue reliabilist, Sosa conceives of intellectual virtues as 
reliable cognitive faculties or powers and describes an intellectual 
virtue as ―a quality bound to help maximize one‘s surplus of truth over 
error‖ (Sosa 1991, 225).  
To Sosa, memory, introspection, sense perception, and the like are 
the properties required for meeting this condition. In his view, the 
beliefs of a person who uses his faculties aptly in appropriate 
conditions are true and justified, and he can be said to have gained 
knowledge (Sosa 1991, 271).
2
  
In the same way, Greco finds intellectual virtues as a reliable 
cognitive power that contributes to truth achievement. According to 
him, intellectual virtues are ―innate faculties or acquired habits, 
leading the individual to truth and to keep away from the false‖ 
(Greco 2002, 287). Greco names perception, reliable memory, and 
various good reasoning as intellectual virtues. He gives an account of 
knowledge based on which one knows a given proposition only when 
one‘s belief in the truth of that proposition is based on an intellectual 
virtue (Greco 2002, 311).  
Zagzebski gives the most effective neo-Aristotle interpretation of 
intellectual virtue. She believes it is not of any use to interpret the 
nature of virtue in terms of a power to endorse having the proper 
knowledge as well as to justify its value over true belief.
3
 Thus, she 
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introduced an approach to epistemology that is intended to justify the 
believer‘s responsibility concerning intellectual virtue and its resulting 
beliefs. She introduced the first systematic theoretical approach to 
virtue with regard to epistemology, laying the grounds for the so-
called virtue epistemology, which she believes to be based on 
Aristotle‘s approach to virtue.4 
This paper aims to explore the nature of epistemic virtue from 
Zagzebski‘s view, followed by an examination of Sadra‘s approach to 
the nature and contributions of intellectual virtue.  
The author aims to determine the extent to which the interpretations 
of epistemic virtue given by the two philosophers are similar. 
Avoiding detailed description of all the elements of Zagzebski‘s or 
Sadra‘s epistemological theory, this paper focuses on the nature of 
epistemic virtue and its contributions to the materialization and 
interpretation of knowledge. To this end, chapter one explores 
epistemic virtue from the viewpoint of Zagzebski and chapter two 
deals with Sadra‘s definition of epistemic virtue. This study examines 
the relationship between moral virtues and epistemic virtues, as well 
as the contributions of virtues and vices to knowledge acquisition. 
There is evidence that Sadra‘s interpretation of epistemic virtue is in 
keeping with responsibilism and though apparently he endorses a 
foundationalist approach in epistemology, his view has the potential to 
offer a virtue epistemology. 
Zagzebski’s View on Epistemic Virtue 
In her book Virtues of the Mind, Zagzebski prefers Aristotle‘s 
happiness-based approach and Slote‘s agent-based approach over 
other forms of virtue ethics. She believes, thanks to end-orientation in 
Aristotle‘s interpretation as well as the centrality of motives found in 
agent-based interpretation given by Slote (2001), her theory has the 
potential to delineate the various elements, including epistemic virtues 
incorporated in her theory. Aristotle sees moral and intellectual virtues 
as requirements for achieving eudaimonia (happiness), believing that 
happiness underlies the virtues both conceptually and existentially. In 
Slote‘s theory, motive plays the essential part in the definition of 
virtue. That is why some components given by Zagzebski for virtues 
make sense in terms of motivation-based theory and the others in 
terms of happiness-based theory (Zagzebski 1996, 82). 
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Aristotle‘s happiness-based approach takes virtues as either 
constituents of good life or the means for achieving happiness. Thus, 
Zagzebski considers virtues as character traits which are required for 
self-accomplishment or living a good life (Zagzebski 1996, 216). 
Zagzebski, like Aristotle, defines moral virtue as a state of soul that 
is acquired and derived from habits.
5
 On the other hand, like Slote, 
Zagzebski believes that virtues are connected to motives and are 
innately valuable (Zagzebski 1996,  82-84). Here is the final definition 
Zagzebski gives of the components of virtue: ―A virtue, then, can be 
defined as a deep and enduring acquired excellence of a person, 
involving a characteristic motivation to produce a certain desired end 
and reliable success in bringing about that end‖ (Zagzebski 1996, 
135). 
This definition consists of several important elements: enduring 
and continuous excellence, being acquirable, motives, success, 
reliability, and end or goal. Zagzebski has borrowed some of these 
components from Aristotle and some from Slote. Yet, this is 
Aristotle‘s theory that underlies her theory. As a result, most 
components have been modeled on the basis of Aristotle‘s theory. As 
Zagzebski takes epistemic virtues as a form of moral virtues 
(Zagzebski 1996, 82), the qualities characterizing epistemic virtue are 
similar to those characterizing moral virtues. 
Virtue is a sort of soul habit that is not characterized by emotions 
and feelings, nor by power, skill, or flair (natural ability); it is not deed 
or habit either. Though all these elements contribute to the 
materialization of virtue and one needs them in practice, none of them 
amounts to virtues. 
Virtue is an acquired excellence of soul, achieved through 
incessant efforts; that is, character traits result from habit, turning into 
a part of our identity through practicing them (Zagzebski 1996, 116) 
and ―that in part defines a person's identity and that leads us to think 
of her as responsible for it‖ (Zagzebski 1996, 135) . To Zagzebski, 
moral virtues and epistemic virtues are important mainly due to the 
role they have in developing the identity. 
Zagzebski substantiates each quality, giving a set of reasons similar 
to those given by Aristotle. 
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Virtue differs from natural ability in that we are not considered as 
good or bad because of our nature and we are not praised for having 
power, while we are praised for having virtues. This is the argument 
shared by Aristotle in Nicomachean ethics (1105a, 1106b). However, 
considering moral virtues as powers, reliabilists such as Greco and 
Sosa must take virtues (at least some of them) as natural. Zagzebski, 
on the one hand, finds this argument right. This is because considering 
virtue as an excellence requires one to consider all excellences as 
virtue. This includes not only good faculties such as good eyesight but 
also properly functioning, natural, cognitive processes such as valid, 
deductive reasoning and natural capacities such as native intelligence 
and skills (Zagzebski 1996, 102). On the other hand, Aristotle believes 
that virtue is acquired, rendering acquisition and naturalness of virtue 
vague. This is because if virtue is considered a power, it is natural. To 
take account of this vagueness, Zagzebski considers only those 
acquired excellences for which we bear responsibility as virtue 
(Zagzebski 1996, 103, 116, 136). Consequently, natural powers are 
not subsumed in perimeter of virtue. 
Since virtues and vices are acquired, individual is held responsible 
for his traits. Zagzebski gives a tenable argument, explaining how it is 
possible for an expansive virtue or vice to infiltrate one‘s trait and to 
become somehow his second nature and an indicator of his identity 
(Zagzebski 1996, 116). 
She explicates that traits constitute the individual‘s identity and 
that we are responsible for things shaping our identity. In the same 
vein, she explains the permanence or endurance of virtue, saying that 
―[t]he fact that a trait is among the more permanent of a person‘s 
qualities means that she bears a fuller responsibly for it than she does 
for qualities that are more fleeing. So a person's responsibility for her 
virtues and vices is connected with the fact that they are gradually 
acquired and are relatively permanent, and these two properties of 
permanence and gradual acquisition are not independent‖ (Zagzebski 
1996,  117). 
Moral virtues are not the only factors contributing to identity 
shaping. Intellectual virtues also play a part in developing identity. 
Thus, we are responsible for them. A worthwhile point raised by 
Zagzebski is that the free will causes us to be held responsible 
for what we do. Going beyond external deeds, she considers belief as 
a kind of deed, and hence subject to our control and will. 
Consequently, we are responsible for our convictions. Since 
convictions are controllable, we are held responsible for how they are 
shaped. 
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She examines how epistemic evaluation depends on human agency 
in a paper entitled "Should Believers Be Agents?‖ (2001). Zagzebski 
elaborates on how and why are we responsible for our beliefs in this 
paper and in her book Virtues of the Mind. 
An argument given by Zagzebski to justify why we are responsible 
for our beliefs is that knowledge is not merely something that happens 
to us but is something to which we contribute through our own efforts 
and skills,
6
 and this leads us to think, like Zagzebski, of ourselves as 
being responsible for having or not having knowledge (Zagzebski 
2001, 261).The following remark made by Zagzebski are very 
valuable in this regard: ―It seems to me that the concept of the self 
constitutes as much by what we know as by what we do‖ (Zagzebski 
2001, 261).  
Given the above-mentioned, the responsibility we bear for 
knowledge is as important as the responsibility we bear for what we 
do. Consequently, we are praised or blamed for what we do. We also 
deserve to take credit or blame for our knowledge. 
As such, Zagzebski prefers responsibilism over reliabilism with 
respect to epistemic virtue.  
Epistemic virtues are not skills, as moral virtues are not skills 
either. Verbal skills, logical skills, mathematical skills, and 
explanatory skills are not virtues (Zagzebski 2001, 114). Yet these 
skills contribute to one‘s performance. Virtues and skills are mutually 
exclusive. 
It is obvious that Zagzebski does not take virtue as a sort of 
emotion (Zagzebski 2001, 104). However, as motive is a component 
of virtue, and motive is a sort of directing emotion, it follows that 
these virtues are related to emotions, though the former is not a sort of 
the latter (Zagzebski 2001, 126). 
However, in effect, virtue and emotions cannot be separated. This 
is because virtue implies overcoming emotions, so there will be no 
virtue as long as there is no emotion. 
Thus, if motives, as Zagzebski says, are considered as a sort of 
emotion directing the activities, then, all virtues include a motivational 
component. 
Though, motive existentially is the willing to do a characteristic 
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deed, it is not merely a willing, having a quality relatable to character 
traits (Zagzebski 2003, 146). It is important to note that according to 
Zagzebski, motive is not the end to which actions are directed, but it is 
a sort of emotion or feeling that excites and directs action toward an 
end (Zagzebski 1996, 130-31). 
Moreover, each virtue is driven by a goal which an individual tries 
to achieve. Thus, a virtue includes two elements: intentional and 
emotional. The same holds true for epistemic virtues. Inspired by a 
desire to discover facts and truth, an open-minded person is 
encouraged by enlightening thinking. These feelings and emotions are 
strong enough to rid him of old beliefs, leading him to explore the 
previously forgotten probabilities. To this end, he is motivated by the 
desire to form more true beliefs or at least to approach the truth 
(Zagzebski 1996,  131). 
The last component is the element of success and accomplishment, 
which differs from motive component yet is connected to it. The 
relation between motive and success varies by the virtue. To 
Zagzebski, having virtue requires one to have reliable success in 
attaining the ends of the motivational component of the virtue; that is, 
the agent should succeed in employing the skills and cognitive 
activities associated with the application of the virtue in his 
circumstances. To this end, a virtuous man should understand 
some aspects of the world, among other things, very well (Zagzebski 
1996, 134). 
As the difference between moral virtue and intellectual virtues are 
reduced to the difference between two moral virtues, and intellectual 
virtues are best viewed as forms of moral virtue, this definition of 
epistemic virtue is similar to that of moral virtue (Zagzebski 1996, 
139).Thus, the components she suggests as constituting the virtue are 
the same. Both are acquired by habituation; ―both also involve 
handling certain feelings and acquiring the ability to like acting 
virtuously‖ (Zagzebski 1996, 158); and both are voluntary and we 
bear responsibility for them. 
In addition, Zagzebski, sees a sort of logical and causal connection 
between the two sets, reinforcing the relationship between the two. 
This means intellectual virtue is a requirement for moral virtues. For 
example, being honest (as a moral virtue) does not require one to say 
what he believes to be true, but he needs intellectual virtue so as to 
determine what to say, what the truth is, and how to express it in 
such a way that the listener believes it in a justifiable way (Zagzebski 
1996, 158). 
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Overall, all virtues, whether moral or intellectual, require 
phronesis, which is very important to Zagzebski, elaborating on the 
contribution of phronesis to intellectual virtue. 
Moral virtue can influence the intellectual virtue, inspiring one to 
put the latter into action. The same is true for a moral vice. That is, a 
moral vice can influence the intellectual virtues and make them 
ineffective. For example, an egoist researcher, seeks to get access to 
those materials that support his ideas and are in keeping with his 
interests. 
The two sets of virtues are essentially different in that all 
intellectual virtues are inspired by the same motive (i.e., knowledge), 
while moral virtues are inspired by different motives. All intellectual 
virtues are aimed at one goal (i.e., knowledge). Yet, each virtue is 
driven by a specific motive as each moral virtue has its specific goal. 
For example, the motive for charity is different from the motive for 
bravery. This difference distinguishes the two virtues. Ultimately, she 
concludes that ―a wide range of intellectual virtues arise out of the 
same general motivation, the motivation for knowledge, and have the 
same general aim, knowledge‖ (Zagzebski 1996, 176). 
Zagzebski believes that motivation for knowledge is more 
dominant than the desire for truth. She argues that ―the goodness of 
the motivation for knowledge is not derived from its connection with 
any other good, not even the good of knowledge.‖ Since she had 
already mentioned that ―the motivational components of the various 
intellectual virtues arise out of the motivation for knowledge and are 
specifications of it,‖ she concludes that ―the value of the motivational 
components of the intellectual virtues are also independent of any 
good outside the agent‖ (Zagzebski 1996,  203). 
The intellectual virtues are useful as they lead the agent to guide 
her belief-forming processes in certain ways. The accomplishment of 
such a goal (i.e., the agent's knowledge) requires the reliability of the 
process that will be acquired through intellectual virtues. 
Up to now, we have discussed the nature of epistemic virtues from 
the viewpoint of Zagzebski. Epistemic virtues are important because 
(1) they lead us to explain knowledge and (2) they lead us to gain 
knowledge. The question is whether all types of knowledge require 
epistemic virtues, and whether it is necessary to have epistemic virtues 
for acquiring knowledge of all types. Zagzebski categorizes knowledge 
into two kinds: (1) low-grade knowledge (2) high-grade knowledge. 
By high-grade knowledge, she means the reflective knowledge and by 
low-grade knowledge, she means perceptive knowledge. Sosa also 
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categorizes knowledge into two groups. However, to him, both levels 
of knowledge share intellectual virtue when knowledge signifies 
intellectual power. But, through this categorization, Zagzebski has 
confined low-grade knowledge to the knowledge gained through 
cognitive ability and has based the high-grade knowledge 
(reflective knowledge) on traits or intellectual properties such as  
open-mindedness, intellectual carefulness, intellectual courage, and so 
forth.  
The individuals lacking intellectual virtues (such as youths and 
animals) can also have sensory knowledge. In contrast, only the 
individuals having intellectual qualities can have reflective 
knowledge, including understanding and wisdom (Zagzebski 1996, 
274). This is why Zagzebski says that individuals lacking intellectual 
virtues can also have sensory knowledge, doing what the individuals 
enjoying intellectual virtue can do. This inspires Zagzebski to suggest 
that we label perceptual and memory beliefs as low-grade knowledge 
as long as they satisfy certain conditions. (Zagzebski 1996, 280). For 
example, the statement ―this paper is white‖ is correct under certain 
perceptive conditions. Only the individual believing so should have 
virtually intellectual motive so as to be inclined to the truth. The way 
in which belief is formed should be such that the individual 
having intellectual virtue can form his belief in this way (Zagzebski 
1996,  281). 
Mulla Sadra's Perspective on Epistemic Virtue 
As one of the most famous Iranian Muslim philosopher, Sadr al-
Muta‘allihin known as Mulla Sadra (or simply Sadra) was the founder 
of transcendent philosophy. Mulla Sadra‘s works such as al-Hikmat 
al-muta'aliyah fi l-asfar al-‘aqliyyah al-arba‘ah, known simply as 
Asfar, and in al-Shawahid al-rububiyyah, al-Mabda’ wa al-ma‘ad, 
Mafatih al-ghayb, and Rasa’il-i falsafi include his invaluable theories 
in areas of epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, philosophy of mind, 
and philosophical theology. This study aims to explore Mulla Sadra's 
views on the nature of epistemic virtue and its contribution to 
knowledge. The aim is to determine whether Sadra's interpretation is 
in keeping with responsibilsm or with reliabilism and that what 
contributions can epistemic virtue make to defining and gaining 
knowledge. How does Sadra see the relation between moral virtues 
and intellectual virtues, and to what extent does he find the two as 
necessary for happy life? Sadra's epistemological theory and the 
philosophical fundamentals on which Sadra has established his theory 
will not be discussed in details. The reference will be made only when 
required. 
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It is obvious that no Muslim philosopher has proposed an 
epistemological theory on virtue, though they have given full accounts 
of the contributions of intellectual virtue to the intellectual life. 
However, Sadra, as other Muslim philosophers (Ibn Sina, Khwajah 
Nasir, Ibn Miskawayh, Ghazali, etc.), has supported virtue ethics and 
elaborated on the role of virtues in happy life. Yet, their point of view 
is not the same as that of Aristotle. 
Like Aristotle, Sadra divides virtue into two categories: moral, and 
rational. Sadra maintains that both moral virtue and rational virtue are 
necessary for a happy life, with intellectual virtue playing the main 
part in achieving happiness. 
Muslim philosophers see virtue or settled inner disposition as a habit 
of soul, leading the individual to do the action in line with that virtue. 
Disposition is a habit of the soul, necessarily effecting the easy procession 
of an action therefrom, without need of any reflection or deliberation. 
(Mulla Sadra 1981, 4:114; Khwajah Nasir 1373, 101; Wickens 1964, 74; 
Naraqi n.d., 1:55; Kashani 1339, 5:95) 
Virtue is both a habit of soul, and, at the same time, it falls between the 
two extremes. (Aristotle 1378; 1107a; Mulla Sadra 1981, 9:127) 
This definition is characterized by several elements that should be 
taken into account for a better understanding of Sadra's stance on 
intellectual virtues. The term ―habit of soul‖ makes it clear that firstly, 
virtue is not a sort of temporary emotion but an enduring and constant 
state, empowering one to make immediate decision followed by 
his/her quick action. Secondly, unlike Socrates' view, virtue does not 
signify knowledge though the former is not void of the latter and that 
the virtuous individuals should be knowledgeable for what they are 
going to do. Moreover, it is implied that virtue is considered as neither 
the ability to act nor the action itself (Mulla Sadra 1981, 4:114). 
However, it leads to action and the action void of virtue is not 
considered a virtuous action. Thus, if one‘s good deeds are driven by 
temporary emotions, such as benevolence or generosity, the deed is 
not considered a virtuous one in Islamic ethics. Yet it is proper and 
motivated by good temporary motives. 
If virtue is to be considered as a quality that brings about honor and 
acclaim, then it has to be acquired rather than a natural trait shared by 
all human beings. All Muslim philosophers, including Sadra, have 
emphasized that virtue is acquired through habit and practice 
(Khwajah Nasir 1373; Miskawayh n.d.; Naraqi n.d.). In their 
viewpoint, the agent is acclaimed for a quality he has gained through 
endeavors and efforts. 
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It was mentioned that virtue is an enduring quality which is 
different from temporary states or emotions. However this does not 
imply that they are not connected. Considering virtue as a balance of 
anger and passion (from which emotions originate) sheds light on how 
these habits are related to emotions. Without such emotions, no virtue 
would be necessary. That is why a virtuous agent should strike a 
balance between his emotions. The balance of pleasure is called 
temperance, and the balance of fear is called courage. Aristotle has 
categorized moral virtuous similarly. 
The motives inspired by moral virtues for doing moral actions are 
also emphasized by Zagzebski. Due to its emotional component, 
moral virtues inspire one as an agent to do an action. By saying that 
virtues lead one to do an action easily and impulsively, Sadra means 
that virtue inspires an individual to do an action he needs to do 
impulsively and easily. Without this motive, the individual would not 
do the action quickly, and if there were no virtue, the individual would 
not have this motive. In fact, the motive component shared by virtue 
inspires the virtuous individual to properly do the action. As long as 
the virtue is existent, the requirements for the accomplishment of 
deeds are met. Consequently, bravery inspires one to bravely do an 
action. The same holds true for chastity. 
Intellectual Virtues 
Sadra divides virtues into two categories: moral and intellectual. He 
categorizes intellectual virtues into theoretical wisdom and practical 
wisdom. As moral virtues are derived from striking a balance between 
emotional powers, intellectual virtues are derived from striking a 
balance between rational powers.  
Theoretical wisdom and practical wisdom are not of power sort. 
Being balanced, rational power can be interpreted as wisdom. Sadra 
calls such a wisdom as ―the head of virtues,‖ which is gained through 
efforts and practice. Thus, it is called acquired wisdom (Mulla Sadra 
1981, 9:89; 1363, 180). Therefore, Sadra does not see intellectual 
virtues as reliable truth-producing powers. He takes them to be 
character traits, leading one ―to perceive the difference between truth 
and falsehood in speech, between real and futile in convictions, 
between beauty and ugliness in deeds‖ (Mulla Sadra 1981, 9:89; 2008, 
420). Like moral virtues, intellectual virtues fall between two 
extremes (Mulla Sadra 1981, 9:127, 4:114; Khwajah Nasir n.d., 119; 
Miskawayh n.d., 46-47). 
To Sadra, wisdom has two senses: (1) rational power, which is a 
character trait considered by Sadra as the head of virtues, and (2) 
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knowledge, which is derived from the wisdom of the first sense 
(Mulla Sadra 1981, 9, 89). That is to say, having wisdom amounts to 
having a sort of knowledge that can be divided into practical and 
theoretical. This is similar to the categorization of virtue into practical 
and theoretical. Theoretical knowledge—namely, philosophy which is 
derived from theoretical wisdom—is interpreted as knowledge 
concerning the true nature of objects as they are. Practical wisdom is 
interpreted as knowledge concerning human deeds. By saying that one 
having wisdom can perceive the difference between truth and 
falsehood, Sadra is referring to the virtue of wisdom, which brings 
knowledge to the individual. The understanding coming from the 
application of such a virtue is, in fact, the knowledge gained through 
intellectual virtues. Therefore, a balanced rational power has two 
qualities called practical wisdom and theoretical wisdom. This is 
because rational power has two functions: (1) knowing the true nature 
of objects and (2) perceiving beautiful deeds and ugly deeds. 
Theoretical wisdom is only responsible for perceiving the true nature 
of objects. However, practical wisdom has two functions: perceiving 
the details and controlling the emotions. Sadra assigns these two 
functions to practical wisdom, even though some philosophers do not 
share this view. 
If intellectual or epistemic virtues are confined to such wisdom, it 
follows that Sadra considers them as a character trait falling between 
two extremes. Being too much, rational power is considered as 
smartness or cunning. Being two low (the other extreme), rational 
power is considered foolishness (Mulla Sadra 1981, 9:91; 2008, 421; 
Khwajah Nasir 1373, 87; Miskawayh n.d., 46). However, intellectual 
and moral virtues are not confined to these four characteristics. 
Muslim philosophers have subsumed a group of virtues in each of the 
above-mentioned main virtues. Vices have been categorized similarly 
(e.g., Khwajah Nasir 1373, 108-09; Miskawayh n.d., 46-47; Farabi 
1405, 30; Mulla Sadra 1981, 4:116).  
Sadra has subsumed the following in the virtue category: beautiful 
justice and management, quick wit, sagacity, correct opinion, and 
astuteness for minute details of actions and hidden calamites of the 
soul (Mulla Sadra 1981, 9; 2008, 421).  
Being too much, Intellectual power takes on the following forms: 
craftiness, cheating, cunning, swindling. Being too low, intellectual 
power takes on the following forms: dull witness, foolishness, 
stupidity (Mulla Sadra 1981, vol.9; 2008, 421). 
Below, some virtues are defined: 
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Quick-wittedness: the individual can derive the results from the 
premises immediately. 
Clarity of mind: the individual is not anxious or mentally agitated 
while making decision. In other words, the individual‘s understanding 
is not deterred by illogical dilemma. 
Ease of learning: the individual avoids the unrelated issues and 
concentrates on what he needs to by not letting his mind getting 
distracted. 
Excellence of intellection: the individual identifies all the relevant 
facts and anything irrelevant is excluded from his mind (Khwajah 
Nasir 1373,  112; Miskawayh n.d., 41). 
Explaining about the factors contributing to proper thinking, Sadra 
elaborates on the qualities one needs in order to know the truth. 
Prejudice, fanaticism, being in rush, being materialistic, and 
predominance of lust and improper emotions are the main obstacles in 
the way of proper thinking. Carefulness, fairness, patience, and 
authenticity are the virtues required for acquiring knowledge (e.g., 
Mulla Sadra 1981, 9:91). 
Sadra’s Responsibilism  
As implied by the foregoing definitions, virtues fall somewhere 
between the two extremes. For example, excellence of learning 
requires one to be moderate while learning the facts and not to be 
distracted by irrelevant issues. This shows that unlike reliabilists, 
Sadra does not see epistemic virtues as a sort of faculty. Sadra 
considers these virtues as character traits, and thus one is responsible 
for having or lacking them. These traits can be understood by drawing 
on Sadra‘s principles. Though many philosophers have elaborated on 
human responsibilities, Sadra‘s philosophical remarks on soul and 
ethics can better do justice to explaining these concepts. Overall, since 
behaviors and knowledge are acquired, the individual is responsible 
for them. In turn, one can acquire these virtues because he has free 
will. These virtues are important as they contribute to identity 
development. 
Like Zagzebski, Sadra does not confine the responsibility to the 
deeds. He includes convictions as well. Interestingly, Sadra believes 
that one‘s responsibility for his beliefs is more important than his 
responsibility for his deeds. Sadra‘s interpretations of one‘s identity as 
well as the elements contributing to identity formation show the extent 
to which he attaches importance to knowledge as a constitutive 
element of identity. It is not unreasonable to claim that knowledge is 
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the most essential element contributing to identity development. This 
is made clearer by exploring his view on the role of knowledge in 
achieving happiness. Thus, Sadra attaches enormous importance to 
knowledge, the proper type of which requires one to be virtuous. 
To better understand the status of epistemic virtue in Sadra‘s 
works, two very important issues will be discussed briefly: 
Unlike famous philosophers such as Avicenna, Sadra believes that 
human beings do not have a constant identity (Mulla Sadra 1382, 128; 
1981, 8:343; 1373, 7:181). In other words, human beings make their 
own identity. The definition given by philosophers of human identity 
as a rational animal is used in logics and is applied to all humans 
(Mulla Sadra 1382, 223). 
 However, existentially, each individual has a unique identity, to 
which no one has made any contribution (Mulla Sadra 1382, 223). 
Making the individual distinct, such an identity is the specific 
existence of that individual (Mulla Sadra 1382,  128, 262; 1981, 
9:185-88; 1363a, 596; 1380, 479).  
The factors contributing to one‘s identity development include 
thoughts, habits, and deeds, which are sometimes interpreted by Sadra 
as intents, habits, and deeds (Mulla Sadra 1981, vol.9). As the 
individual has free will, he can acquire them. Given the free will, one 
can be said to have built his own identity and is responsible for it. As a 
matter of fact, an agent is responsible for the factors contributing to 
the development of his identity. Knowledge, deed, habit, and intent 
show that all internal and external factors somehow influence the 
individual, making him responsible. Sadra never states in his works 
that one should be held responsible and therefore acclaimed or blamed 
for having or lacking the perception faculty. However, he believes that 
perception faculties are necessary for creating perceptional forms and 
how these faculties are used. Moreover, the characteristics of the agent 
willing to acquire these sensory perceptions make him responsible for 
the beliefs he has gained. On the other hand, the agent‘s perception 
powers should be sound and the conditions should be met so that the 
forms can be perceived correctly. (To Sadra, perception powers are 
tools, and it is the soul that creates the forms of the known object. 
However, the creation requires the tools to be sound and the 
conditions to be met. One needs them to perceive correctly. However, 
Sadra does not present them as epistemic virtues). 
This paper focuses on the traits making considerable contributions 
to knowledge acquisition and hence one‘s identity development. 
These are called intellectual virtues.  
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Sadra interprets identity development based on his philosophical 
principles such as trans-substantial motion and the unity of the 
intelligent and the intelligible. Sadra‘s philosophy of mind and 
philosophical theology maintains that in the other world, one is 
responsible for what he has created. 
Given the triple components discussed above, one can observe that 
Sadra, like Zagzebski, has incorporated all the factors contributing to 
human‘s identity development in evaluation, punishment, and 
rewards. All moral virtues and thoughts and hence intellectual virtues 
have a part to play in this process. Thus, intellectual virtues cannot be 
evaluated separately from moral virtues. However, the following 
points need to be clarified: the relation between moral virtues and 
intellectual virtues, and the contributions of these virtues to the 
epistemological, material and other-worldly life. Sadra opted for an 
end-oriented approach involved in both his moral view and 
epistemological view. To Sadra, all human activities are aimed at 
achieving happiness. This is an end that is valuable by itself. If one 
interprets happiness in terms of moral and intellectual life, living a 
moral life is not on par with having real felicity, even though living a 
moral life is a requirement for living an intellectual life. Sadra 
considers one‘s knowledge as his real felicity and believes that though 
moral life, sometimes interpreted as justice, is valuable, it is not to be 
taken as real human perfection. He maintains that moral life results in 
being saved from hell, but it does not guarantee heaven. Real felicity 
is dependent on the knowledge gained by the agent. Having more 
knowledge and knowing higher beings lead to more happiness. To 
have such knowledge, the agent needs to have intellectual virtues. 
However, Sadra does not take sensory knowledge as real knowledge, 
and does not explicitly mention the requirement of intellectual virtues 
for acquiring such knowledge. Yet, given the interpretation Sadra 
gives about sensory knowledge (Mulla Sadra 1981, 25-26; 1382,  25-
26), it follows that virtues are required in this case as well. 
I do not intend to discuss the types of happiness or knowledge from 
Sadra‘s perspective. The reference will only be made to evidence 
showing the extent to which Sadra attaches importance to epistemic 
virtues. This following evidence needs to be given attention: (1) 
virtues are a requirement for achieving felicity, and (2) non-
epistemological elements and improper epistemological elements can 
be obstacles in the way of knowledge acquisition. As moral and 
intellectual virtues are required for acquiring knowledge and 
achieving real happiness, moral and intellectual vices are the obstacles 
in the way of knowledge acquisition. Sadra names the following vices 
as instances of obstacles in the way of knowledge acquisition: 
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meanness, fear, arrogance, and immoral deeds such as murder, back-
biting, and gossip (Mulla Sadra 1981, 9:139, 7:61). He sees mental 
accuracy and being realistic as requirements for being immune from 
fault and refraining from sins (Mulla Sadra 1380, 249) and being 
immune from pleasures and lust as requirements for believing and 
having faith in God (Mulla Sadra 1981, 7:24). Those committing these 
sins cannot perceive the facts in the intellectual world (Mulla Sadra 
1981, 1:362, 9:28, 136, 303; 1382, 336; 1380, 480, 478; 1360, 1:95-
97). Not only does Sadra see vices as obstacles in the way of 
perceiving intellectual thoughts (1363b, 210 ), but he also considers 
the failure to perceive the minor issues as a result of moral vices and 
sins (Mulla Sadra 1981, 2:228), claiming that the achievement of all 
sciences entails the piety of the soul (Mulla Sadra 1363a, 143). This 
evidence is adequate to conclude that to Sadra, intellectual knowledge 
is not be acquired without intellectual and moral virtues. In other 
words, Sadra has based knowledge on the existence of virtues, 
considering vices as obstacles in the way of knowledge acquisition. It 
should be made clear to what extent the properness of sensory 
knowledge depends on virtues.  
Given the foregoing discussion, it can be well deduced that, in 
Sadra‘s viewpoint, having knowledge requires one to have intellectual 
virtues. To Sadra, it is not important to merely have convictions, but 
how an agent turns out to be is also important. This is important with 
respect to two aspects: the kinds of convictions one gains and the way 
in which one gains the convictions. Having moral and intellectual 
virtues, one can have convictions that are morally and mentally true 
and justified. 
Conclusion 
This study sought to compare Sadra‘s view on the nature of 
epistemic virtue with that of Zagzebski. The aim was to determine if 
Sadra‘s approach is consistent with responsibilism or with reliabilism 
and that to what extent these two philosophers‘ approaches can be 
similar. 
What is important in Zagzebski‘s definition of epistemic virtues is 
that she seeks to identify the main components of epistemic virtues in 
terms of the elements constituting the nature of moral virtue. 
Zagzebski considers epistemic virtues as forms of moral virtue. She 
does not categorize the soul into two distinct parts—namely, 
knowledge-related part and deed-related part. Zagzebski believes that 
knowledge and deed are so intertwined and interdependent that one 
cannot evaluate them separately. Obviously, by saying that intellectual 
virtues are forms of moral virtues, Zagzebski does not mean them to 
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be the same or to consider intellectual virtues as a type of moral 
virtues,
7
 but she means that we should not consider knowledge and 
deed as separate from each other. This is because both of them 
mutually influence each other and the same time equally contribute to 
the development of identity. 
Sadra has given a more accurate explanation of this fact. 
Elaborating on the dynamic nature of humans, and taking knowledge, 
deeds, motives, and moral dispositions as constituent elements of 
identity, Sadra sheds light on the extent to which knowledge and deed 
contribute to one's development of identity. Elsewhere, delineating the 
effects of virtues, vices, morally right deeds, and morally wrong deeds 
on knowledge, Sadra highlights the relation between knowledge and 
action more emphatically than Zagzebski.  
The qualities Zagzebski draws on to interpret the nature of 
epistemic virtue are the same as the qualities Sadra draws on. Sadra 
considers epistemic virtue as a character trait falling between two 
extremes. Such virtue is acquired and motivational. Moreover, if one's 
awareness of something is motivated by a motive apart from 
knowledge, he lacks real knowledge (i.e., wisdom). 
To Sadra, knowledge is aimed at a final end—namely, God. That is 
to say, if knowledge of any sort is valuable, it should be aimed at 
approaching God; otherwise, the knowledge would not be real. 
Inspired by this motive, one's knowledge of God or knowledge of 




The foregoing discussion elaborated on the contribution epistemic 
virtue makes to knowledge achievement. Both Sadra and Zagzebski 
believe that only the knowledge originating from intellectual virtue is 
valuable. To put it in another way, as Sadra maintains that as 
knowledge and happiness are the same and that real knowledge is 
dependent on intellectual virtues, it follows that the conviction will be 
considered knowledge provided it is be based on intellectual virtues. 
                                                     
7. In this regard see Pouivet (2010). 
8. Khwajah Nasir discusses the external motives that are worthless and render the agent's deeds 
non-virtuous. He takes these qualities as pseudo-virtue. It follows that if one's knowledge is 
motivated by motives apart from wisdom (e.g., fame or snobbishness), he is not wise and his 
knowledge is not real knowledge (Khwajah Nasir 1373, 122-23; Wickens 1964, 89).  
Khwajah interprets this person's deeds as pseudo-wisdom. In the same vein, if one's 
chastity or bravery are motivated by an external motive such as fame or self-interest, he is not 
virtuous. This shows that being virtuous requires one to have right motive; that is, the motive 
which complies to the virtue. 
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That Sadra considers knowledge as an outcome of wisdom 
indicates that he does not deem the set of beliefs one gains as 
knowledge. To him, knowledge is more valuable than beliefs, though 
the latter are required for knowledge acquisition. 
In conclusion, it seems that not only do these two philosophers‘ 
accounts of the nature and role of epistemic virtue are similar, but 
Sadra‘s epistemological theory has many potentials, enabling us to 
base an epistemological theory on epistemic virtues. 
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